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,

by
COLONEL JOHN E. COON, USA
event of unprecedented tactical maneuvers by
the PRC, it is submitted that the weight of
doctrinal authority and national interest
precludes extreme or permanent deviation
from the general line.
National goals have been outlined, from
time t o time, in genera1 and doctrinaire
statements from Peking. Two of the more
recent formulations date from 1969. The
first, from Lin Piao's report t o the Ninth
Party Congress, emphasizes preservation of
the regime and strengthening the economy as
fundamental domestic goals.

(What domestic and foreign goals are
likely to influence policy formation in
Peking during the foreseeable future?
What constraints are operative on the
achievement of such goals? What are the
more specific objectives likely to be
selected by the People's Republic o f
China for the coming decade?)

Mutual understanding is one of the
prerequisites for intelligent interaction
between nations. In the case of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and the United
States, doors to such understanding are
inching open on both sides. Hopefully each
new opening will shed fresh light on matters
of mutual agreement or disagreement. Certain
fundamental perspectives, however, will
r e m a i n true unless clear evidence of
substantial change appears.
In the absence of such evidence, the
following summary of general goals and more
specific objectives will be valid for any
assessment of policies likely t o be adopted by
Peking in the foreseeable future. I t is based on
a continuity in theory and practice which
suggests the national priorities set by the
Maoist leadership since 1949. Even in the
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Our aim is to smash revisionism, seize
back that portion of power usurped by
the bourgeoisie, exercise all-round
dictatorship of the proletariat in the
superstructure, including all spheres of
culture, and strengthen and consolidate
the economic base of socialism so as to
insure that our country continues to
advance in giant strides along the road of
socialism.

The second, from the new Constitution of
the Chinese Communist Party, addresses
external goals.
The Communist Party of China firmly
upholds proletarian internationalism,
resolutely unites with all true
Marxist-Leninist political parties and
organizations in the whole world, with all
oppressed peoples and nations of the
whole world, supporting one another and
learning from one another, and fights to
overthrow imperialism headed by the
United States, modern revisionism headed
by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique,
and reactionaries of all countries, in order
to build a new world free from
imperialism, capitalism, and systems of
exploitation.
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Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai greet students in Peking.

successors." It was this question which
furnished one of the prime motives of Mao's
Cultural Revolution and which has been only
partially resolved.
Finally, perhaps the harshest reality which
the Peking leadership must face is the
continuing inadequacy of the economy t o
support their aspirations t o great power
status. Coupled with the deficiencies of the
domestic economy on both the agricultural
and industrial sides, is the lack of sound trade
and technological relations with the more
advanced nations which might contribute
s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o China's desired leap into
modern economic power status. Recent
developments such as the new trade
agreements with the USSR and the partial
opening of doors to the United States suggest
that, in the long term, some alleviation of the
difficulties may be possible.
National Objectives for the PRC, since they
are more specific, are more difficult t o
express with authority. Attempting t o

Constraints on the achievement of such
goals are serious for the PRC. Mao would like
to consider China's huge population as an
asset, a vast reservoir of selfless dedication,
inexhaustible ingenuity, and unlimited
productivity. But the population is a problem
in more ways than one. To the basic question
of how t o feed so many mouths is added the
overwhelming task of governing 800 million
people-a task unprecedented in world
history. Thus Peking faces bureaucratic
complexity, regional self-interest, and mass
human inertia as factors intervening between
the formulation of a directive at Party Central
and its modified implementation at the
grassroots in the provinces. Such constraints
operate in different ways and t o varying
degrees o n internal and external policy.
Associated with that complex of problems
is another- the impending transition from
first-generation leadership, with doubts about
the ideological vigor and reliability of the
c o m i n g g e n e r a t i o n o f "revolutionary
19

determine individual objectives of PRC
domestic and foreign policy involves second
guessing the Peking leadership. This is
particularly true since current objectives may
change with tactical shifts which are often
unpredictable—e.g. "Ping-Pong Diplomacy."
Those listed below, however, are apt to be
enduring, though emphasis may vary from
time to time.

dictatorship," with the triple mission of
defense, production, and political work.
( 1 1 ) To develop a significant advanced
weapons capability including intercontinental
ballistic missiles w i t h thermonuclear
warheads.
(12) To organize, train, and indoctrinate
the nation-wide People's Militia as a force for
economic mobilization and national defense.
(13) To maintain social order and stability
throughout China under centralized control,
i n c l u d i n g integration of the national
minorities.

a. Domestic. This list is not necessarily in
order of priority; many objectives overlap or
are interdependent.
( 1 ) To maintain the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in control of the country and the
people, with the prospect of an orderly
transition of power to "revolutionary
successors. "
(2) To sustain the revolutionary vigor and
ideological purity of the CCP in a revitalized
Party organization de dicated to perpetuating
the thought of MaoeTse-tung and its future
effectiveness.
(3) To mobilize the spirit of the Chinese
people under Party guidance, with Mao either
actually or symbolicly, as "the Great
Helmsman."
(4) T o
improve
governmental
organization at all levels, eliminating excessive
bureaucratic aspects and promoting economy
and efficiency.
( 5 ) To build socialism in China, walking
on the "two legs" of industry and agriculture
toward a modern great power economy.
(6) T o industrialize the nation rapidly
with a simultaneous emphasis on heavy
industry and numerous, dispersed small
plants.
(7) To improve the agricultural sector of
the economy through collectivization and
modernization in the rural communes.
(8) To expand and modernize the
national transportation system, with primary
emphasis on the rail lines.
(9) To push a vigorous research and
development program adapted to Chinese
circumstances and needs, with particular
reliance on the innovative genius of the
masses.
(10) To maintain large, modern, regular
armed forces as a "pillar of proletarian

b. Foreign. These objectives, too, are not
necessarily listed in order of priority and are
often interrelated.
( 1 ) To discourage foreign incursions of
any type, while settling the "liberation of
Taiwan" as an internal Chinese matter.
(2) To reduce non-Asian influence in the
Far East to the minimum practical, with
particular attention to incursions by the US
and the USSR.
(3) To present a realistic challenge,
politically and economically, to Japanese
influence in Asia.
( 4 ) T o e n c o u r a g e deference and
dependence in all other Asian governments as
the correct attitude toward the Government
of the PRC.
(5) To establish the CCP as the model for
national Communist parties throughout Asia.
(6) To provide stimulus to wars of
national liberation, particularly in the Middle
East, Africa, and Latin America, whenever
they may work toward the long-range goal of
"encircling the cities of the world."
(7) T o establish g o v e r n m e n t - t o government ties with any developing nation
where Chinese prestige might be increased at
the expense of the US and the USSR.
(8) To assist Communist or potentially
Communist subversive movements throughout
the world when Chinese prestige or the
Chinese economy will not suffer seriously
from such assistance.
(9) To advance the Maoist version of
Communism as the legitimate successor to
Marxism-Leninism for the world, in
contradistinction to "Soviet revisionism."
20
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organizations such as the UN.
Obviously, so summary a treatment of such
an undefinable subject is no more than an
outline offered for expansion by others as
interest or need may indicate. It does,
however, have the advantage of presenting an
overall view of the forest without risking
confusion by the trees. And this perspective,
as maintained earlier, will remain true in the
absence of clear evidence of any fundamental
change in the Chinese Communist ideology
we call Maoism.

( 1 0 ) T o maintain such state-to-state
relationships with the Soviet Union as will
promote Chinese national interests while not
compromising the ideological position of the
PRC.
(1 1) T o accelerate the inevitable decay of
the "capitalist-imperialist" powers.
(12) To win great power status and
d o m i n a n c e o f the world Communist
movement by diplomatic, psychological,
economic, and military pressures applied in
state-to-state relations or within international
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